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 791 
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PRIVACY: WHEN IS IT 
REASONABLE TO SEARCH A MINOR? 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK                              
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT 
Matter of Jamal S.1 
(decided December 4, 2014) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An individual’s fundamental right to privacy is one of few 
that are essential to protect a person’s dignity.2  Because of the nature 
of this right, it is critical for government actors to stay within the lim-
its of their authority when imposing on an individual’s privacy right.3  
This privacy right originated from the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, which grants individuals “the right  . . . to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.”4  Article 1, section 12 of the New 
York State Constitution affords individuals a right to be protected 
from unreasonable searches and seizures, which uses language indis-
tinguishable from the Fourth Amendment.5 
Although the right to be free from governmental intrusion and 
control upon everyday life is important, it is not an absolute right.  
Assuming the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, on-
ly searches and seizures that are unreasonable are prohibited.6  Gen-
 
1 999 N.Y.S.2d 7 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2014). 
2 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989).  Fourth Amendment 
protections apply only to intrusions by government actors or those private parties who act as 
an “instrument or agent of the Government.”  Id. 
3 Id. 
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
5 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
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erally, an unreasonable search is one performed without a warrant.7  
In order for law enforcement to obtain a warrant probable cause must 
be present.8  Without first obtaining a warrant, a search and seizure is 
presumptively unreasonable.9  There are, however, several exceptions 
to the warrant requirement and, if applicable, then a warrantless 
search and seizure does not violate the constitutional right to privacy.  
On the other hand, if the search and seizure was unlawful and violat-
ed an individual’s constitutional right, then the exclusionary rule may 
apply to remedy the violation.10  When the exclusionary rule applies, 
evidence acquired in violation of a defendant’s constitutional right 
may be inadmissible at a criminal trial against such defendant.11  This 
rule of law, grounded in the Fourth Amendment, serves as a deterrent 
to police officers and prosecutors who may unlawfully gather evi-
dence against a defendant.12 
In the recent decision of Matter of Jamal S., the court for the 
New York Appellate Division for the First Department focused on 
two issues.  The first issue was whether the defendant was lawfully 
arrested because of his status as a minor.13  This issue is relevant be-
cause if the defendant was lawfully arrested, as opposed to being de-
tained, the officers acted reasonably when searching the defendant 
incident to the arrest.  The court, however, held that the defendant 
was unlawfully arrested because the defendant was a minor, and that 
the defendant was being held for temporary detention.14  Since the 
warrantless search incident to the arrest exception did not apply be-
cause the defendant was not lawfully arrested, the court then ad-
dressed the second issue: whether the defendant’s Fourth Amendment 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated 
when police officers asked the defendant to remove his shoes, which 
 
7 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009). 
11 Id. 
12 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648, 651 (1961). 
13 N.Y. CRIM PROC. LAW §140.10 (McKinney 2013); Family Ct. Act §305.2(2); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW §240.20(7) (McKinney 2105). The Criminal Procedure Law allows officers to 
arrest a person for committing any offense in their presence; however, the Family Court Act 
supersedes this when dealing with minors, and only as to minor who are arrested for a crime.  
The Penal Law at issue in this case applies to disorderly conduct, which is classified as only 
a violation. 
14 Matter of Jamal S., 999 N.Y.S.2d at 9. 
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ultimately led to the discovery of a gun.15  The court held that the 
search of the defendant’s shoes was unreasonable because the police 
officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant pre-
sented a danger.  Therefore, the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right 
to be free from unreasonable searches was violated.  This Note will 
first discuss the facts and procedural background of Matter of Jamal 
S. in Section II.  It will then address both issues by analyzing the rel-
evant Federal and New York State law in Sections III and IV and 
then applying the relevant law to Matter of Jamal S. in Section V. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF MATTER OF 
JAMAL S. 
Police officers approached the defendant, Jamal, for riding his 
bicycle in the wrong direction on a one-way street.16  Their intentions 
were to issue a summons for the violation; however, Jamal informed 
the police officers that he did not have any identification.  He also in-
formed the police officers that he was sixteen years old.17  Subse-
quently, he was patted down, handcuffed, and brought to the police 
precinct to be identified and issued a summons.18 
When the defendant arrived at the precinct he was again 
frisked, and neither of these two preliminary searches revealed any 
contraband.19  The defendant was then detained for twenty minutes, 
at which time he disclosed to the police officers that he was only fif-
teen years old.  Upon learning this information, the police officers in-
formed the defendant’s mother of her son’s whereabouts and told her 
to come in the morning.20 
The defendant was then placed in a juvenile room awaiting 
his mother’s arrival.  As part of police procedure to assure that indi-
viduals in their custody are not hiding contraband, a different officer 
asked Jamal to remove his belt, shoelaces, and shoes.  The officer’s 
request was not based on any “reason to expect that Jamal had any-
thing on him.”21  As a result, the officer found a gun inside of Jamal’s 
 
15 Id. at 10. 
16 Matter of Jamal S., 999 N.Y.S.2d at 8. 




21 Matter of Jamal S., 999 N.Y.S.2d at 8. 
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right shoe after Jamal removed it.22 
The appellate division held in a 3-2 decision that the police 
search, which led to the discovery of a firearm in Jamal’s shoe, was 
unreasonable and that the weapon should have been suppressed as ev-
idence.23 
The majority provided two reasons to support its holding.  
First, the defendant was unlawfully arrested because he was a mi-
nor.24  The court reasoned that an arrest of a minor leading to a search 
might only be conducted when the minor is taken into custody for 
behavior that would constitute a crime if the minor were an adult.25  
The court found that this was not applicable under the facts in the 
present case because Jamal was arrested and being charged with dis-
orderly conduct under New York Penal Law § 240.20(7), which is 
not a crime but a violation.26  Therefore, because the underlying ar-
rest was non-criminal, the request to remove his shoes was unjusti-
fied because it was intrusive under the circumstances.27 
The court also provided an alternative reason to support its 
holding.  The court stated that even if the arrest of the defendant was 
justifiable due to the defendant’s inability to produce identification, 
thus making it impossible to issue a summons on the spot, the gun 
was still uncovered as a result of an unreasonable search.28  The 
court’s main conclusion for deeming the search unreasonable was be-
cause the defendant had already been searched during two pat down 
frisks, both prior to the search in question and no illegal contraband 
had been detected.  Therefore, due to the preliminary searches, the 
police officers had no reason to believe that the defendant concealed 
contraband or was a threat to anyone’s safety, and should not have 
conducted the third search of the defendant’s shoes.29 
However, the dissent had a different opinion in the present 
case.  The dissent first found that the defendant was lawfully arrested 
because the police officers reasonably believed that the defendant 




24 Id. at 9. 
25 Id. 
26 Matter of Jamal S., 999 N.Y.S.2d at 9. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 10. 
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Second, the dissent found that the defendant was arrested for a non-
traffic offense of disorderly conduct and was unable to produce iden-
tification.30  The dissent concluded that it was lawful for the offic-
ers—who were under the impression that the defendant was an 
adult—to take the defendant into custody because it was impractical 
for them to issue a summons without identification. 
In addition, the dissent also found that the majority failed to 
provide support as to why the search violated the defendant’s legiti-
mate expectation of privacy.31  Further, requiring the defendant to 
remove his shoes was reasonable because the state has an interest to 
protect not only the officers and other people in the jail, but the de-
fendant himself.32  The dissent further concluded that requiring the 
defendant to remove his shoes was not considered a strip search and, 
therefore, was not an unreasonable measure in the interest of safety 
precautions.33  The prior pat down frisks of the defendant did not 
make the subsequent search unreasonable because case law allows a 
further search when an individual is being detained in a precinct.34  
The last point made by the dissent is that if the court allows this 
search to be unlawful, it would go against public policy and chaos 
could have occurred in the present case and in future similar cases.35 
III. THE FEDERAL APPROACH 
The Fourth Amendment safeguards an individual’s right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.36  Specifically, it 
shields people from “arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the 
 
30 Id. at 10-12. 
31 Matter of Jamal S., 999 N.Y.S.2d at 10. 
32 Id. at 13. 
33 Id. at 12.  See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375 
(2009).  The Court stated: 
The indignity of the search does not, of course, outlaw [a strip search], 
but it does implicate the rule of reasonableness as stated in T.L.O., that 
the search as actually conducted [be] reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.  The 
scope will be permissible, that is, when it is not excessively intrusive in 
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.  
Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
34 Matter of Jamal S., 999 N.E.2d at 12-13. 
35 Id. 
36 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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Government or those acting at their direction.”37  This fundamental 
right to privacy is guaranteed only when there is state action, mean-
ing searches and seizures conducted by the government or its agents; 
it does not protect individuals against intrusions by a private party.38 
A. Step One: Was It a Search of an Individual’s 
Person or Property? 
The Supreme Court in Katz v. United States,39 an influential 
case relating to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, defined a search as 
an infringement by the government of a person’s fundamental priva-
cy interest, as opposed to an invasion of a person’s property.40  “The 
Fourth Amendment protects people and not simply ‘areas’ against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of 
that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a phys-
ical intrusion into any given enclosure.”41  The Supreme Court later 
adopted a new definition of a search and recognized that the Fourth 
Amendment only applies when a person has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.42  For a person to have a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy, “there is a twofold requirement, [sic] first that a person have ex-
hibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that 
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘rea-
sonable.”43 
Courts will determine whether the defendant had a subjective 
 
37 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 613-14. 
38 Id. 
39 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
40 Id. at 353. 
41 Id. 
42 U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).  This two prong test was first articulated by 
Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Katz.  The Supreme Court later adopted Harlan’s 
test in Jacobsen.  Id. at 113. 
43 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  In Katz v. United States, the defendant 
was in a public phone booth with the door shut behind him and believed that his phone con-
versation would be private from any government intrusion.  Id.  Although the defendant was 
in a public phone booth, the booth was considered “a temporar[y] private place whose mo-
mentary occupants’ expectations [include] freedom from intrusion.”  Id.  The Supreme Court 
held that the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy because he closed the door 
showing that he did not want to expose himself to the public.  Id.  The Supreme Court also 
held that “the Fourth Amendment protects people and not simply areas against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”  Id.  The defendant placed himself in an enclosed structure; therefore, 
he established a subjective expectation of privacy.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
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expectation of privacy by looking at the defendant’s conduct, specifi-
cally whether the defendant sought to preserve something as pri-
vate.44  However, when a person does not take precautions to keep his 
property private, and a person “knowingly exposes [his property] to 
the public, even in his own home or office, [he] is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection.”45  When the defendant does not pro-
tect his or her property from being accessed by the public or a third 
party, he has no subjective expectation of privacy. 
B. Step Two: Was It Reasonable under the 
Circumstances? 
Further, a search only occurs if the subjective expectation of 
privacy by the individual is also a reasonable expectation by society’s 
standards.46  To determine what society recognizes as reasonable, the 
courts use an objective standard.  They look to what a reasonable per-
son under the circumstances would expect.47 
Courts “are guided by established principles” when determin-
ing when a reasonable expectation of privacy does or does not exist.48  
The Supreme Court has already acknowledged that the Fourth 
Amendment does not safeguard all expectations of privacy but only 
those that society views as “legitimate.”  Additionally, the Court has 
determined that in some settings, even if a person has a subjective 
expectation of privacy, a reasonable expectation of privacy does not 
exist in society’s view.49 
The reasonableness of a search is determined by considering 
the totality of the circumstances.  In Bell v. Wollfish,50 the Supreme 
Court established factors to be considered when determining the rea-
sonableness of a given search or seizure: “the scope of the particular 
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for in-
 
44 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
45 Id. at 351. 
46 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
47 Id. 
48 United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 1980). 
49 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (stating that the protection provided by the 
Fourth Amendment does not extend to open fields because a reasonable person should not 
expect privacy “for activities conducted out-of-doors in fields”). 
50 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
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itiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.”51  All four factors 
must be considered collectively.52 
The Supreme Court in Vernonia School District 47J v. Ac-
ton,53 decided the issue of whether subjecting school children to drug 
tests in order for the children to participate in extracurricular activi-
ties violated the Fourth Amendment.  The Supreme Court stated, 
“what expectations are legitimate varies, of course, with context de-
pending upon whether the individual asserting the privacy interest is 
at home, at work, in a car, or in a public park.”54  The Court then de-
clared that the individuals’ relationship with the State must be taken 
into account as well.55  It is also imperative when determining the 
reasonableness of a search under the totality of circumstances to as-
certain whether it occurred on private property versus public proper-
ty, or to an individual on probation as opposed to someone who was 
not.56  This is significant because if the government’s interest out-
weighs the individual’s privacy interest, then the individual may not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy.57 
In United States v. Edwards,58 the issue before the Court was 
whether a warrantless search and seizure of the defendant’s clothing, 
which occurred ten hours after the defendant’s arrest, was reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.  In Edwards, the defendant was arrest-
ed for attempting to break into a Post Office.  He forced open a win-
dow, leaving behind paint chips on the windowsill.  Police officers 
the next morning had to purchase substitute clothing for the defend-
ant, so that they could seize the defendant’s clothing he was wearing 
at the time and since his arrest to search for evidence of the crime.59  
 
51 Id. at 559. 
52 Id. 
53 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
54 Id. at 654. 
55 Id. 
56 Id.; see Griffin v. Wisconsin., 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (holding that a probationer has a 
reduced expectation of privacy, which justified a warrantless search of his home by his pro-
bation officer, based on a special need to protect the community); see also California v. 
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (finding that when the defendants discarded their 
property “in an area particularly suited for public inspection . . . respondents could have had 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items that they discarded . . . [as] the 
police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity 
that could have been observed by any member of the public”). 
57 Id. 
58 415 U.S. 800 (1974). 
59 Id. at 801-02. 
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This investigation revealed paint chips, which matched the samples 
that had been taken from the window at the Post Office.60 
The defendant argued that the search of his clothing was un-
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment because “the administra-
tive process and the mechanics of the arrest ha[d] come to a halt,” 
therefore, making the search unreasonable without a warrant.61  The 
defendant claimed that ultimately the evidence should not have been 
introduced at trial.62  However, the Supreme Court held that the 
search was reasonable.63  The Court reasoned that “while the legal ar-
rest of a person should not destroy the privacy of his premises, it does 
for at least a reasonable time and to a reasonable extent—take his 
own privacy out of the realm of protection from police interest in 
weapons, means of escape, and evidence.”64 
The purpose of a procedural search must be based on a gen-
eral suspicion or an extreme need to protect the public’s safety.  The 
people subjected to the procedural search must also have a minimal 
expectation of privacy.65  State agents may conduct a procedural 
search without specific suspicion of an individual as long as these 
considerations are true.66  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recog-
nized in Way v. County of Ventura,67 that not all procedural search 
policies are reasonable.  However, the search is reasonable if it is 
“reasonably related to the detention facility’s interest in maintaining 
security.”68  This finding is based on Bell v. Wollfish, where the Su-
preme Court acknowledged “the difficulty of operating a detention 
facility safely, the seriousness of the risk of smuggled weapons and 





63 Edwards, 415 U.S. at 801-02. 
64 Id. at 808-10. 
65 Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 
(holding that there was no individualized suspicion to drug test railroad employees, but be-
cause drug tests were only taken from employees following a major train accident, the acci-
dent constituted general suspicion). 
66 Skinner, 489 U.S. 602. 
67 Way v. Cnty. of Ventura, 445 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2006).  In Way, the defendant was 
arrested for a misdemeanor and was strip-searched before she entered the jail’s general 
population based on a procedural policy.  The scope of the intrusion was a “frightening and 
humiliating invasion” by state actors.  Id. at 1160. 
68 Id. 
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judgment in adopting and executing policies necessary to maintain 
institutional security.”69 
C. Step Three: Was There an Exception to the 
Warrant Requirement? 
Even if it has been determined that the search performed by 
the government was unreasonable without a warrant, several excep-
tions may apply.  The relevant exception discussed in Jamal S. was 
the presence of exigent circumstances.  Courts have held that a war-
rantless search does not violate the Fourth Amendment if an exigent 
circumstance exists.70  Exigent circumstances are an exception to the 
Fourth Amendment that allow law enforcement to legally search 
“persons, houses, papers, and effects” without a warrant.71  In order 
for an exigent circumstance to apply, the situation must require im-
minent action.  The three main types of exigent circumstances are: (1) 
the hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; (2) the destruction of evidence; and 
(3) being presented with a safety risk.72  Of these three, “the risk of 
danger to the police or other persons” is discussed in Jamal S.73 
IV. THE NEW YORK APPROACH 
The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures has been incorporated through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and made applicable to the 
states.74  The police power left to the states permits states to provide 
its citizens with broader protection than the United States Constitu-
tion provides.  Article 1, section 12 of the New York State Constitu-
tion affords its citizens the right to be free from unreasonable search-
es and seizures, using identical language to the Fourth Amendment.75  
 
69 Id. at 1161. 
70 United States v. Gallo-Roman, 816 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1987). 
71 Id.  “Exigent circumstance refer generally to those situations in which law enforcement 
officers will be unable or unlikely to effectuate an arrest, search or seizure for which proba-
ble cause exists, unless they act swiftly, even though the officers have not obtained prior ju-
dicial authorization.”  Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990). 
74 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961). 
75 N.Y. Const. art. I, § 12.  It states: 
10
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With respect to the protection against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, the New York Court of Appeals “has not hesitated to expand 
the rights of New York citizens beyond those required by the Federal 
Constitution.”76 
New York State also recognizes several exceptions to the 
warrant requirement, including exigent circumstances.  However, be-
cause the New York Constitution affords greater privacy protection 
than federal law, the main difference between the New York State 
approach and the federal approach is that New York State courts are 
more inclined to decide that whenever there is an infringement on an 
individual by the government of an area where a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy exists, a search has occurred irrespective of whether 
the investigative approach was mainly nonintrusive.77 
New York State case law has established that police officers 
have the authority to frisk an individual who cannot produce identifi-
cation upon being lawfully stopped and, therefore, must be brought 
into the police precinct.78  The New York Court of Appeals has held 
in People v. Ellis,79 that “once it be[comes] evident that [the] defend-
ant [cannot] be issued a summons on the spot because of his inability 
to produce any identification, the officers [are] warranted in arresting 
him to remove him to the police station and in frisking him before 
doing so.”80  In Ellis, the defendant was driving without his head-
lights on and was subsequently pulled over.81  At this time, the police 
officer asked the defendant for his license and rental agreement, be-
cause the license plates indicated to the police officer that the car was 
rented.82  The defendant could not produce either.  The police officer 
then asked for any form of identification, and the defendant could not 
produce that either.  The police officer then decided to take the de-
 
[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
Id. 
76 People v. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 638, 642 (N.Y. 2001). 
77 People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (N.Y. 1990). 
78 People v. Ellis, 465 N.E.2d 826 (N.Y. 1984). 
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fendant to the precinct so that he could be identified and issued a 
summons.83  Before entering the police vehicle, a pat down of the de-
fendant revealed his possession of bullets and marijuana.84  The po-
lice then further searched the defendant’s glove compartment and 
found a loaded gun.  The court ruled that the defendant was lawfully 
brought to the police precinct because of his inability to produce 
identification, and that the evidence found by the officers was ob-
tained through a lawful search of the defendant and his car. 
Under the exigent circumstance doctrine, the risk of danger is 
not limited strictly to the criminal area.  In People v. Molnar,85 the 
New York Court of Appeals provided an example of the criminal 
arena as the extreme of “shooting in progress or a hostage held.”86  
This example was further discussed in Molnar, in which the facts 
state that the defendant “had words” with his girlfriend which led to 
the defendant taking his girlfriend’s life in a brutal manner.87  After 
the woman’s death, the defendant left her body in a closet in his 
apartment.88  As her body began to decompose, it released a rotting 
odor which alerted the defendant’s neighbors, and ultimately led 
them to call the police.89  After the police arrived and made every ef-
fort to contact the defendant but failed, the police decided to have 
maintenance personnel pry the door open.90  Once inside, police no-
ticed vermin throughout the entire apartment, the windows complete-
ly black as they were covered with flies, and a pair of socks bulging 
from the closet.91  The police then discovered the decomposed body 
covered in maggots.92 
The defendant argued that the police did not have a warrant to 
enter his apartment and, therefore, his Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated and that all the evidence obtained must be suppressed.93  
However, the New York Court of Appeals held that exigent circum-
 
83 Id. 
84 Ellis, 465 N.E.2d at 828. 
85 774 N.E.2d 738 (N.Y. 2002). 
86 Id. at 741. 
87 Id. at 738-39. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Molnar, 774 N.E.2d at 738-39. 
91 Id. at 738-39. 
92 Id. at 739. 
93 Id. at 739-40. 
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stances existed because the police were “acting as public servants in 
the name of protecting public health and safety.”94  The Court of Ap-
peals affirmed because the search was reasonable and denied the de-
fendant’s motion to suppress the evidence.95 
Like federal precedent, New York case law also permits war-
rantless inventory searches.96  An inventory search is a search estab-
lished by a police agency that is conducted according to a “single fa-
miliar standard or procedure.”97  An inventory search must satisfy 
two elements for it to be held reasonable.  First, “the relationship be-
tween the search procedure adopted and the governmental objectives 
that justify the intrusion” must be reasonable.98  Second, there must 
be adequate “controls on the officer’s discretion.”99 
In People v. Galak,100 a police officer saw a car parked near a 
closed automobile shop with two people inside.  The police officer 
checked the license plate number and discovered that the license 
plates belonged to another vehicle and that the registration had ex-
pired.101  At this point, officers questioned the driver and the passen-
ger, revealing that neither had a valid license.  The officers then, fol-
lowing department protocol, impounded the vehicle.102  Once 
impounded, the police officers searched the passenger compartment 
and found a dagger, a black jack, and an ignition device owned by the 
defendant.103  The defendant argued that although the officer fol-
lowed the departmental procedure, the department’s standard proce-
dure itself was unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.104  The New York Court of Appeals held that the police 
exceeded their discretion when they set up this inventory policy and, 
therefore, the search was invalid under the Constitution.105 
 
94 Id. at 742. 
95 Molnar, 774 N.E.2d at 739-40. 
96 People v. Galak, 610 N.E.2d 362, 365 (N.Y. 1993). 
97 Id. at 365. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 610 N.E.2d 362, 365 (N.Y. 1993). 
101 Id. at 365. 
102 Galak, 610 N.E.2d at 365. 
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V. APPLICATION 
As discussed above, courts apply a balancing test when de-
termining whether a search is reasonable.  The test consists of weigh-
ing the individual’s expectations of privacy against the state’s inter-
ests in crime prevention and safety.  If the government’s interest 
outweighs the individual’s privacy interest, a warrantless search may 
be deemed reasonable.  Although this sounds like a simple formula, 
many factors are considered by the courts when determining the rea-
sonableness of a given search. 
A. Reasonableness of the Arrest 
The outcome in Jamal S. may differ depending on whether 
the federal or New York State approach is applied.  Although New 
York law permits police officers to “arrest a person for any ‘offense’ 
that is committed in the [their] presence,”106 officers are prohibited to 
comply with this law if the person is a minor.  In such case, law en-
forcement must then follow the Family Court Act, which only allows 
police officers to take minors into custody if they have committed a 
crime.  “The term ‘crime’ includes only misdemeanors and felonies, 
not violations.”107  Therefore, the application of the first issue pre-
sented by the court in Jamal S., whether the defendant was lawfully 
arrested, might vary from the federal approach. 
The court in Jamal S. held that the arrest of the defendant for 
failure to provide identification was unreasonable based on New 
York Penal Law § 240.20(7), which made it unlawful to arrest a mi-
nor for the underlying offense at issue.  The majority’s holding is 
consistent with Ellis.  Like the defendant in Ellis, the defendant in 
Jamal S. was brought to the police precinct to be identified and sum-
monsed after failing to produce identification.108  The majority in 
Jamal S., however, distinguished Ellis and found that its reasoning 
should not be used to uphold the arrest.  The court came to this con-
clusion because the defendant in Ellis was an adult who had commit-
ted a traffic infraction, whereas the defendant in Jamal S. was a mi-
nor and only charged with a violation. 
 
106 Matter of Jamal S., 999 N.Y.S.2d at 9. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 8. 
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Although the majority’s statement about the defendant being 
minor is correct, the police officers were unaware that the defendant 
was a minor at the time he was arrested.  In fact, the arresting officers 
had reason to believe that the defendant was an adult because he had 
lied about his age.109  It was only after the defendant was arrested and 
after a prolonged period of time at the police precinct did the defend-
ant finally reveal that he was not an adult.  Once the officers were in-
formed of the defendant’s minor status, they changed their rationale 
for the search, no longer seeking to place the defendant under arrest, 
but rather detaining him until his mother’s arrival.  Thus, the initial 
arrest of the defendant was not unwarranted by law enforcement. 
B. Reasonableness of the Search inside the Police 
Precinct 
The defendant in Jamal S. argued that the search of his shoe 
was unreasonable because officers had previously patted him down 
and had not discovered contraband.110  Therefore, being required to 
remove his shoes was unnecessarily intrusive because the officers 
had no reasonable basis to believe that the defendant posed a threat to 
their safety.  This argument is similar to that made by the defendant 
in Edwards, who claimed the later search of his clothing conducted 
by the officers was unreasonable because he had been previously 
searched incident to arrest.111  However, in Edwards, the Supreme 
Court found that the state had a compelling government interest in 
preserving safety and evidence of a crime and held that the search 
was reasonable.  The same rationale should have applied in the Jamal 
S.  When the police officers brought the defendant to the precinct, the 
government had a compelling interest in preventing means of escape 
and uncovering weapons to secure the safety of all persons within the 
jail.  At the same time, the defendant was detained in an area with a 
diminished interest in privacy due to his own conduct.  Based on the 
following, the court in Jamal S. should have found that the govern-
ment’s interest in safety outweighed whatever limited privacy interest 




110 Id. at 10. 
111 Edwards, 415 U.S. at 801-02. 
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Although many searches are deemed reasonable because the 
law enforcement obtained a warrant, not obtaining one should not 
necessarily invalidate the government’s conduct because “[t]he 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness—not the war-
rant requirement.”112  The majority in Jamal S. supported its holding 
by relying on Molnar to show that the search was unreasonable be-
cause no exigent safety risk existed necessitating a warrantless search 
of the defendant’s shoes.113  As previously noted, the majority in 
Jamal S. failed to provide an analysis of the competing interests of 
the defendant and the State as they applied in Molnar.  Had the court 
applied such analysis, it may have found that the government had a 
substantial interest in maintaining order within its jails to assure the 
safety of the officers, those being held in police custody, as well as 
the defendant himself. 
1. Exception to the Warrant Requirement 
The first inquiry when determining whether a warrantless 
search is reasonable is to determine whether an exception to the war-
rant requirement can be applied.  In Molnar, the defendant contested 
the emergency exception to the warrant requirement because the of-
ficers waited an hour before breaking into his apartment.  The New 
York Court of Appeals in Molnar balanced the competing interests of 
the individual and the government and held that the intrusion was 
reasonable because the emergency exception to the warrant require-
ment applied, despite the delay.114  In contrast, the court in Jamal S. 
contradicted the precedent set forth in Molnar when it found that a 
safety risk did not exist because “Jamal was continuously in police 
custody.”115  The Jamal S. court concluded that the safety risk was 
not imminent because time had elapsed.  This conclusion is contrary 
to Molnar, which held that under certain conditions a delayed search 
will not necessarily lessen the exigent safety risk.  In Molnar, a main 
reason behind the court’s decision to apply the exception was that it 
would have been difficult for the officers to obtain a search warrant 
while also dealing with the danger in a timely manner.  This is com-
 
112 Molnar, 774 N.E.2d at 739 (internal quotations omitted). 
113 Matter of Jamal S., 999 N.Y.S.2d at 9-10. 
114 Molnar, 774 N.E. 739. 
115 Jamal S., 999 N.Y.S.2d at 10. 
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parable to Jamal S. because it would be unreasonable to expect offic-
ers to obtain a search warrant for every person being detained to en-
sure their safety. 
2. Place 
Assuming the exigent circumstance exception does not apply, 
the search in Jamal S. was still reasonable under the totality of the 
circumstances.  Molnar is similar to Jamal S. because both defend-
ants argued that an area in which they had a high expectation of pri-
vacy had been unjustly invaded by law enforcement.  Both a person’s 
body and a person’s home are areas that have a high expectation of 
privacy.  Although the home is a place where a person has an in-
creased expectation of privacy, the defendant in Molnar had a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy due to the odor emanating from his 
house.  The place where the search occurred in Jamal S. was subject 
to two levels of scrutiny to determine its reasonableness.  First, the 
search in Jamal S. took place inside a jail precinct, a place with a 
lesser expectation of privacy compared to the home in Molnar.116  A 
jail precinct is state-owned and operated, and a person being detained 
within a state precinct is not usually there without reason.  The sec-
ond level of scrutiny pertains to what was being searched, which in 
this case was the defendant’s shoes.  The search of the shoes should 
not have been found unconstitutional based on the totality of the cir-
cumstances.  In Jamal S. and Molnar, both defendants had a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy while the government’s interest in safety 
exceeded the defendants’ interests. 
3. Manner and Scope 
The police officers in Molnar acted in a reasonable manner by 
first attempting to contact the defendant in numerous ways before en-
tering his apartment; when this failed, the officers reasonably con-
tacted maintenance personnel.  Once inside the apartment, the offic-
ers acted reasonably because they were not overly invasive; the 
stench made it obvious that something was decomposing in the home 
and the socks of the dead woman visibly protruded from the closet.117  
 
116 Id. at 9. 
117 Molnar, 774 N.E.2d at 739. 
17
Moruzzi: When Is It Reasonable to Search a Minor?
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
808 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
 
Similar to the officers in Molnar, the police officers in Jamal S. acted 
in a reasonable manner and scope.  The search that the officers con-
ducted of the defendant’s shoes was not overly intrusive.118  The of-
ficers asked the defendant himself to remove his own shoes, so that 
the officers would be able to see if the detainee had concealed any 
weapons or contraband.119 
4. Justification 
The officers in Molnar had justification for the search because 
the defendant lived in an apartment building, which he rented, sur-
rounded by neighbors.  The neighbors alerted the police about the 
stench, and it is the officers’ job to protect public health and safety.  
The justification for the search in Jamal S. was similar to Molnar be-
cause the reason for the officer’s request for the defendant to remove 
his shoes was to protect the general population within the jail, includ-
ing any other detainees and the officers themselves.120  If officers 
were not permitted to ask detainees to remove their shoes, it would be 
difficult to maintain order and ensure safety.  The majority in Jamal 
S. emphasized that the defendant was a minor and this fact was a ma-
jor reason behind the unreasonable search.121  However, this fact 
could be even more of a justification to conduct the search.  As a mi-
nor, the defendant was committed to the temporary custody of the 
State as a guardian until his mother arrived to pick him up.  The ma-
jority in the present case failed to recognize that police officers were 
responsible for the safety and protection of the defendant himself 
while he was being detained.122 
5. Routine Procedure 
The majority opinion in Jamal S. cited Galak for the proposi-
tion that the fact that a procedure is standard does not necessarily 
mean that it is reasonable.  However, the majority used this case in-
 
118 Searching a person’s shoe has been recognized as a limited search and does not rise to 
the level of a strip search, which would be unreasonable.  Matter of Jamal S., 999 N.Y.S.2d 
at 12. 
119 Id. at 9. 
120 Id. at 12. 
121 Id. 
122 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654. 
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correctly because its argument was based on the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Colorado v. Bertine,123 which held that “reasonable police 
regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good 
faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment . . . .”124  Both cases, Bertine and 
Galak, involved police department standard procedures regarding in-
ventory searches, specifically as to impounded vehicles, in contrast to 
Jamal S where the standard procedure regarded searching those in its 
custody.  However, if the majority were to compare the standard pro-
cedure at issue to similar standard procedures, the court may have 
found the search reasonable. 
The standard procedure must satisfy two elements for it to be 
found reasonable.125  The customary procedure adopted must relate to 
and justify the intrusion by law enforcement.  In addition, the stand-
ard procedure cannot offer law enforcement too much discretion.  
The standard procedure of having a defendant remove his belt, shoe-
laces, and shoes, to protect the safety of those in the jail precinct, in-
cluding the defendant himself, meets both elements of this test.  In 
addition, a reasonable inventory procedure does not permit officers to 
exercise their own discretion in its application.  There is little, if any, 
discretion involved in the request to “remove your belt, shoelaces, 
and shoes” as this procedure is extremely forthright. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Both the Federal and New York State Constitutions prohibit 
unreasonable searches and seizures performed by the government.  
However, determining what is reasonable is not simple.  As this Note 
demonstrates, finding a balance between people’s privacy rights and 
the government’s interest in protecting the people can be a compli-
cated undertaking.  The court in Jamal S. established a dangerous 
precedent by deeming the search of the detainee’s shoes unreasona-
ble, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was only a minor.  As 
a matter of public policy, the court erred in determining that the 
search was unreasonable, and should not have banned the search of 
the defendant’s shoes in police stations.  Further, if the New York 
Court of Appeals where to affirm the Appellate Division, the court 
 
123 479 U.S. 367 (1987). 
124 Id. at 374. 
125 Galak, 610 N.E.2d at 365. 
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would be approving a precedent that invites minors to hide weapons 
or illegal contraband in their shoes.  Police officers will not be per-
mitted to ask minors who are detained to remove their shoes, and mi-
nors will be able to place illegal items in their shoes without fear of 
discovery.  Thus, one can conclude that this holding may promote 
concealing contraband, instead of discouraging it.  Affirming the Ap-
pellate Division jeopardize law enforcement safety because the abil-
ity to maintain order in its jails and precincts would be greatly dimin-
ished. 
Overall, it is reasonable to believe that society is not prepared 
to recognize that a person has an expectation of privacy regarding 
what is inside his shoes while being detained in a police precinct.  
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion in Jamal S., the officers’ con-
duct did not violate the defendant’s right to be free from unreasona-
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